Suchergebnisse

We propose a dynamic general equilibrium model with human capital accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services (such as military draft or social services). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored dynamic cost arising from distortions in time allocation over the life-cycle. We provide conservative estimates for the excess burden that arises when the government relies on forced labor rather than on income taxation to finance public expenditures. Our results suggest that eliminating the draft could produce considerable dynamic gains, both in terms of GDP and lifetime utility.

We evaluate the claim that individuals exhibit a magnitude effect in their discounting behaviour, where higher discount rates are inferred from choices made with lower principals, all else being equal. If the magnitude effect is quantitatively significant, it is not appropriate to use one discount rate that is independent of the scale of the project for cost–benefit analysis and capital budgeting. Using data from a field experiment in Denmark, we find statistically significant evidence of a magnitude effect that is much smaller than is claimed. This evidence surfaces only if one controls for unobserved individual heterogeneity in the population.